Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Structured Note Valuation incorporating Issuer Credit risk

Introduction: Structure note products provide a way for investors to get customized exposure to various asset classes. These notes can be for instance, providing exposure to emerging markets performance or Crude oil performance etc. Like any financial product, these notes carry market risk. Additionally, they carry issuer risk that is note issuer might default. Hence it becomes imperative to include the issuer risk in the valuation of structured note products.

Issuer Credit Risk: Credit risk of an issuer can be measured in two ways. One way is to imply credit risk from Credit default swaps on the note issuer. Another way to do is to imply credit risk from corporate debt issued by the note issuer. These two methods provide a way to gauge the counterparty risk of the structured note issuer. In practice, corporate debt markets are utilized in determining the issuer credit risk. Mainly because of higher volatility of credit default swap spreads measure of credit risk is prone to wide swings and hence not suitable for incorporating credit risk in structured note valuation.

Issuer Debt: Issuer of structured notes in general issue bullet fixed rate debt in the corporate bond market. These bonds trade at a spread over benchmark treasury security. In determining the value of these corporate bonds investors use Z spread or constant spread over the treasury yield curve. This z spread is excess spread over the treasury rate that is required by the investor to buy the note issued by this issuer. Since treasury rate is considered as risk free rate, this additional spread gives a measure of the credit risk. Once we have decided which bond is used then we need to obtain traded ASK price of this bond. This is very important element. Corporate debt is a liability for the issuer and to retire this debt the issuer has to buy back the bonds and this can happen only at ASK price in the market.

Credit risk using Z-Spreads:

1) Identify the maturity of the bond based on the maturity of the structured note

2) Obtain the ASK price of the bond and the Z spread

3) Shift the Yield curve by the Z spread and discount the cash flows of the note.

Survival probability

1) Identify the maturity of the bond based on the maturity of the structured note

2) Obtain the ASK price of the bond

3) Construct survival probability curve and discount the cash flows of the note.

Modeling Survival Probabilities1.

Survival-based modeling of the Credit Risky bonds follows the assumption of Fractional Recovery of Par. Under this assumption, a bond recovers a given fraction of its face value upon default, regardless of remaining cash flows.



Present value of the Credit Risky bond can be written as sum of Cash flows when there is no default and fraction recovered when default happens.



CF = Cash flow (Principal or Interest)

I{X} = Indicator function for a default event

Zt = Credit Risk Free discount Factor

Et = Expectation under Risk neutral Measure

R = Recovery Rate

Assuming the independence of Default times, Recovery Rates and interest Rates above equation can be translated as









Q (ti) :Survival Probability

Q (t0) = 1 (Survival Probability at current Time)

ZBase : Risk Free Discount rate

Above equation derives the price of the bond based on Survival-probability based approach.





1. Defining, Estimating and Using Credit Term Structures (Lehman Brother Research)

Sunday, August 26, 2012

Structured Notes

These days I am working on structured note derivative products in terms of valuation, risk and analysis.
In this regard I have analyzed a structured note issued by HSBC in march 2012 and published that work on Bloomberg news letter.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/104007186/Brief-STNT-Newsletter-2012168-1-1" style="margin: 12px auto 6px auto; font-family: Helvetica,Arial,Sans-serif; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; font-size: 14px; line-height: normal; font-size-adjust: none; font-stretch: normal; -x-system-font: none; display: block; text-decoration: underline;">Brief STNT Newsletter 2012168 1 (1)

Friday, July 27, 2012

Why they got it wrong?




Most economists have articulated their responses to USD interest rates based on rising fiscal deficits, loose monetary policy and rise of China and emerging markets. All of these lead to cogent reasoning to state that interest rates have nowhere to go but up. Reality proved otherwise. Rates are at historical lows. How do we explain this? Has our understanding of interest rates is flawed. Were these experts looking at wrong side of their crystal balls when making these predictions?

There are 21 experts who said Rates have nowhere to go but up.

http://www.businessinsider.com/21-rates-have-nowhere-to-go-but-up-2012-7?op=1



Let’s look at some parables that helped people to arrive at this conclusion



We hear from John Mauldin with regards to his profound analysis on state of economy, fiscal affairs, investment philosophy and strategies. Like many of his peers he also joined the bandwagon of bond bears.



April 2004: John Mauldin, Bull's Eye Investing

"In this book, I hope to give you an idea of the broad trends that will be evident for the remainder of the decade and help you target your investments to take advantage of these trends. Successful investing for the period 2004 through 2010 will require you to do things differently than you did in the 1980s and 1990s. We started the last bull market with high interest rates, very high inflation, and low stock market valuations. All the elements were in place to launch the greatest bull market in history.

Now we’re in the opposite environment. The stock market has high valuations, interest rates have nowhere to go but up, the dollar is dropping, and the twin deficits of trade imbalance and government debt stare us in the face."

10 year yield in April, 2004: 4.197

Nassim Taleb needs no introduction. He got his fame by bringing Black Swans to the world of Finance and risk. This oracle also joined the party with Bond Bears.

BONUS: February 2010: Nassim Taleb

It’s “a no brainer” to sell short Treasuries, Taleb, a principal at Universa Investments LP in Santa Monica, California, said at a conference in Moscow today. “Every single human being should have that trade.”

10 year yield in February, 2010: 3.546

Jim Rogers famed hedge fund manager well known for his bets on commodities has eschewed US dollar and treasures.

BONUS: May 2011: Jim Rogers

"In my view that's coming to an end...the bond bull market is coming to an end. If any of you have bonds I would urge you to go home and sell them. If any of you are bond portfolio managers I would get another job,"

10 year yield in January, 2012: 3.157



These three folks are among numerous investors who have made fortunes. They all have one thing in common apart from investment success. It is they are all bond bears. All of these bears got it wrong. I can think of one thing is their analysis is sound but missed some important facts. What are they?

Housing Crisis in USA triggered a chain reaction of recession in the interconnected and globalized world. Most of them underestimated the degree of globalization and hence the transmission effects of financial crisis in USA. In response to financial market crisis central banks got into action of coordinated monetary policies. China and USA jolted their economies with huge Stimulus money. Euro region and emerging market economies have injected a gush of liquidity into their economies. Alarmed by the degree of easing in monetary policy and deepening fiscal deficits dollar bears emerged from hibernation expecting treasuries will drop in their values. At this time, US economy is suffering with unemployment at 8.2%, Euro zone witnessed new solvency issues and export dependent emerging market economies started seeing their fortunes disappearing in front of their eyes. In my opinion these events worked against bond bears. Ironically, improvements in these three factors are bearish for treasuries. So for bond bears battle is not over yet.

Metaphorically: Snowman made up of treasuries was expected to melt due to rise of sun (fiscal imbalances and loose monetary policy) but averted by the cold snap (Euro Crisis).